We consider the problem of two-player zero-sum game. In this setting, there are two agents working against each other. Both the agents observe the same state and the objective of the agents is to compute a strategy profile that maximizes their rewards. However, the reward of the second agent is negative of reward obtained by the first agent. Therefore, the objective of the second agent is to minimize the total reward obtained by the first agent. This problem is formulated as a min-max Markov game in the literature. The solution of this game, which is the max-min reward (of first player), starting from a given state is called the equilibrium value of the state. In this work, we compute the solution of the two-player zero-sum game utilizing the technique of successive relaxation. Successive relaxation has been successfully applied in the literature to compute a faster value iteration algorithm in the context of Markov Decision Processes. We extend the concept of successive relaxation to the two-player zero-sum games. We prove that, under a special structure, this technique computes the optimal solution faster than the techniques in the literature. We then derive a generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm that computes the optimal policy when the model information is not known. Finally, we prove the convergence of the proposed generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
In two-player zero-sum games, there are two agents that are competing against each other in a common environment. Based on the actions taken by the agents, they receive a value corresponding to the current state and the environment transitions to the next state. The objective of an agent (say agent 1) is to compute a sequence of actions starting from a given state to maximize the total discounted value. On the other hand, the objective of the other agent (agent 2) is to compute a sequence of actions that minimizes the total discounted value. This problem is formulated as the Markov game and the value that is obtained as max-min of total discounted value starting from state i is called the equilibrium value of state i. The policies that achieve this equilibrium value are the optimal policies of the agents.
When the model information of the environment is known, a Bellman operator for the two-player zero-sum game [1] is constructed and a fixed point iteration scheme analogous to the value iteration is used to compute the equilibrium value. However, in most of the two-player zero-sum settings in the real life, the model information is not known to the players and the objective is to compute optimal policies utilizing the state and reward samples obtained from the environment. Minimax Q-learning is a well-known learning algorithm for computing the optimal policies of both the agents from the samples.
In our work, we construct a modified equilibrium Q-Bellman operator by using the technique of successive relaxation for the Markov games and prove that the contraction factor is at most the contraction factor of the standard equilibrium Bellman operator, under some assumptions. This implies that, when the model information is known, the equilibrium value could be computed faster using our proposed scheme. We then proceed to develop a generalized minimax Q-learning based on the proposed modified equilibrium Q-Bellman operator.
The minimax Q-learning algorithm is first proposed in [2] . Two-player general sum games are the games where the values of the agents are unrelated, in general. If the value of an agent is negative of the value of another agent, it reduces to zero-sum games. A Nash Q-learning algorithm for solving the general sum games is proposed in [3] . In [4] , Friend-or-Foe (FF) Q-learning for general sum games is proposed and is shown to have stronger convergence properties compared to the Nash Q-learning. A generalization of Nash Q-learning and FF Q-learning namely correlated Q-learning is discussed in [5] . In [6] , desirable properties for an agent learning in multi-agent scenarios are studied and a new learning algorithm namely "WoLF policy hill climbing" is proposed. A comprehensive discussion about algorithms for multi-agent learning is provided in [7] .
We now discuss some variants of minimax Q-learning in the literature. In [8] , the minimax TDlearning algorithm utilizing the concept of TD-learning is proposed. Recently, the minimax version of the Deep Deterministic policy gradient algorithm is developed in [9] .
The concept of successive relaxation in the context of the Markov Decision Process (MDP) has been first applied in [10] . In our earlier work [11] , we have proposed successive over-relaxation Q-learning for model-free MDPs. In this work, we extend the concept of successive relaxation to the two-player zero-sum games and propose a convergent generalized minimax Q-learning. The contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We propose a modified equilibrium Q-Bellman operator for two-player zero-sum Markov games and show that the operator is a max-norm contraction.
• We show that under some assumptions, the contraction factor of modified equilibrium Q-Bellman operator is smaller than the standard equilibrium Q-Bellman operator.
• We establish the relation between the fixed points of modified equilibrium Q-Bellman operator and the standard equilibrium Q-Bellman operator.
• We show that, although the fixed point of modified Q-Bellman operator is different from the fixed point of the standard Q-Bellman operator, the equilibrium value function computed by both the operators is still the same.
• We propose a generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm and prove the almost sure convergence of the algorithm. This could be utilized to compute the equilibrium value function and optimal policies.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum Markov game [12] . The two players in the game are referred as agent 1 and agent 2. A two-player zero-sum Markov game is characterized by a tuple (S, U, V, p, r, α) where S := {1, 2, · · · , i, j, · · · , M} is the set of states that both the agents observe, U = {1, . . . , m} is the finite set of actions of agent 1, V = {1, . . . , n} is the finite set of actions of agent 2, p is the transition probability rule i.e., p(j|i, u, v) denotes the probability of transition to state j from state i when actions u ∈ U and v ∈ V are chosen by agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. r(i, u, v) denotes the single-stage reward obtained by the agent 1 in state i when actions u and v are chosen by agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. Note that, in the case of zero-sum Markov game, the reward of the agent 2 is the negative of the reward obtained by the agent 1. Also, 0 ≤ α < 1 denotes the discount factor. The goal of the agents in the Markov game is to learn policies π 1 : S − → ∆ |U | and π 2 : S − → ∆ |V | , where ∆ d denotes a probability simplex in R d and π 1 (i) (and π 2 (i)) indicates the probability distribution of actions to be taken by the agent 1 (and agent 2) in state i that maximizes (and minimizes) the discounted objective given by:
where s t is the state of the system at time t and E[.] is the expectation taken over the states obtained over time t = 1, . . . , ∞. Let J(i) denote the equilibrium value in state i obtained by solving (1) . It can be shown [13] that the equilibrium value function satisfies fixed point equation given by:
where Q(i) is a matrix of size |U| × |V |, whose (u, v) entry is given by Q(i, u, v) = r(i, u, v) + α j∈S p(j|i, u, v)J(j) and the function val[A], for a given m × n matrix A, is defined as follows:
where x ∈ ∆ m and y ∈ ∆ n . The system of equations in (2) can be rewritten as:
where the operator T is defined as:
The operator T and the set of equations (2) are analogous to Bellman operator and Bellman optimality condition, respectively, of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [13] . Value iteration is a popular scheme for solving Bellman equation in MDPs. In [12, 14] , the operator T is shown to be a contraction and a scheme analogous to value iteration is developed for obtaining the equilibrium value function. We refer to this as equilibrium value iteration. It works as follows. An initial value function J 0 is selected arbitrarily and a sequence of J n n ≥ 1 is generated in the following manner:
Since the equilibrium value function J satisfies:
equilibrium value iteration obtains the solution of the game. In this way, the equilibrium value iteration can be utilized to obtain equilibrium value function. However, in most of the practical scenarios, the model of the game (probability transition matrix and single-stage reward function) is not known to the agents. The agents instead receive samples of the game. One of the popular learning algorithms for agents to obtain optimal policies and equilibrium values is the minimax Q-learning algorithm [2] .
We now briefly discuss the derivation of the minimax Q-learning update rule from the fixed point iteration discussed above. Recall that Q(i, u, v) is defined as:
Now, from the equation (2), the above equation (8) can be rewritten as:
where Q(j) is a matrix with Q(j, u, v) as the (u, v) th entry. The equation (9) is analogous to Q-Bellman equation in Markov Decision Processes. We refer to this equation as equilibrium Q-Bellman equation.
Finally, the minimax Q-Learning algorithm is derived by applying the stochastic fixed point iteration scheme [15] to the equation (9) . The update rule of minimax Q-learning algorithm at iteration n is:
where γ n (i, u, v) is the step-size and (i, u, v, r, j) is the current state, actions, reward and next-state sample. Here the initial minimax Q-values {Q(i, u, v), ∀i ∈ S, ∀u ∈ U, ∀v ∈ V } are selected arbitrarily.
In the subsequent sections, we derive a modified equilibrium Q-Bellman equation for two-player zerosum Markov games. This enables us to develop a novel generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM In this section, we describe our generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm. The algorithm proceeds as follows. At each iteration n the algorithm utilizes the current state, actions, reward and next-state samples given by (i n , u n , v n , r(i n , u n , v n ), i n+1 ) to compute the update direction d n+1 and the current generalized minimax Q-value estimates Q n are improved as shown in steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1 respectively. The algorithm terminates after a prescribed number of iterations or after a chosen accuracy is obtained. Note the role played by relaxation parameter w in Algorithm 1 compared to standard minimax Q-learning (refer equation (10)). Observe that the case w = 1 reduces generalized minimax Q-learning to the standard minimax Q-learning.
Algorithm 1 Generalized minimax Q-Learning
Input: w: Choose w ∈ [0, w * ] (refer Section IV) is a relaxation parameter i n , u n , v n , i n+1 : current state, actions and next state r(i n , u n , v n ): single-stage reward Q n (i n , u n , v n ) : current estimate of Q(i n , u n , v n ) Output: Updated Q-values Q n+1 estimated after n iterations of the algorithm 1: procedure GENERALIZED MINIMAX Q-LEARNING:
Remark 1: Note that the step 2 of Algorithm 1 requires computation of val[Q n (.)] which is a linear program.
Remark 2: The equilibrium value for a given state i can be obtained from the Algorithm 1 as follows:
and the optimal policies of the agents are obtained as: The analysis in this section follows a similar notation and style as in our earlier paper [11] . We first derive a few properties of val [.] operator that would be used in the subsequent analysis.
Note the repeated application of the facts 1≤i,j≤n x i y j = 1, sup (a n + b n ) ≤ sup a n + sup b n in the arguments. This completes the proof.
. Proof: Using Lemma 1 with C = 0, we get:
Taking squares on both sides, we have:
Lemma 3: Let E = [e ij ] m×n where e ij = 1 ∀i, j then for any constant k and the system of equations can be reformulated as the fixed point equation T J = J and that T is a contraction under the max-norm with contraction factor α. Let w * be given by:
As the probabilities p(i|i, u, v) ≥ 0 ∀(i, u, v), it is clear that w * ≥ 1. For 0 < w ≤ w * define a modified operator T w : R |S| → R |S| [10] as follows:
(T w J)(i) = w (T J)(i) + (1 − w)J(i),
where w represents a prescribed relaxation factor. Note that T w is in general not a convex combination of T and I as w * ≥ 1. Let J * denote the equilibrium value of the Markov game, from equation (7), T J * = J * . Now, (T w J * )(i) = w(T J * )(i) + (1 − w)J * (i) = wJ
